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Constitutional Judicial Tenure
Legislation?-The Words May Be

New, But the Song Sounds the

Same
By C. Randolph Fishburn*

Introduction
Congressional attempts to control the federal judiciary have
been as regular and predictable as shifts in public attitude toward
the activities of Congress. For many congressmen, it has been a
frustrating realization that the Constitution mentions only impeachment, a lengthy and cumbersome ordeal, as the means of removing federal judges from office. Over the years, Congress has
been asked to consider alternative methods of removal, but the
mandate of the Constitution has impeded attempts to legislate
control of the federal judiciary.
These removal proposals failed because many of the important
constitutional questions were not satisfactorily resolved. Among
these questions were the Framers' intent in providing specifically
for impeachment, the meaning and extent of judicial tenure and of
the "good behavior" limitation, the ambigious language of the Constitution itself, and most significantly, the importance of judicial
independence.
Recently, however, Public Law No. 96-458, The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, was
signed into law to create the first federal judicial disciplinary body
in the history of the United States. This Act places the responsibility of disciplining federal judges in the hands of other federal
judges by legislatively redefining the functions of the judicial councils of each circuit and of the Judicial Conference of the United
States. These judicial bodies are now empowered to impose various
disciplinary sanctions, short of actual removal.
* B.A., 1978, University of Southern California; member, third year class.
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The current proposal was designed to circumvent the difficult
constitutional issues. Unfortunately, most of the constitutional
problems remain. This note will explore this recent congressional
victory, which seeks to impose a greater measure of control over
federal judges. The desirability or need for this disciplinary mechanism will be seriously questioned, as will the likelihood that this
proposal could realistically achieve its stated goals. This note will
conclude that, even at the possible expense of an occasional unredressed abuse, the disciplinary mechanism of impeachment
should be, as this author believes the Framers intended it to be,
exclusive.
I.

Attempts to Limit Judicial Tenure

It has been said that federal judges never retire, and leave office only when they die. In addition to these two methods of removal, the Constitution provides for an impeachment mechanism.1
From its inception, when Thomas Jefferson described this
mechanism as "not even a scarecrow," 2 legislators and chief executives have advanced proposals designed to avoid the time-consuming and formidable impeachment process. In the course of nearly
200 years, this impatience with the impeachment mechanism has
taken many forms, yet surprisingly, the proposed alternate methods of removal have been extraordinarily similar.
The proposals have taken two general forms: historical removal by abolition and modern removal by judicial tribunal. Removal by abolition seeks to remove a judge by simply doing away
with the judicial post he or she occupies.3 Removal by judicial tribunal envisions a panel appointed to investigate and recommend
the removal of a particular judge on the basis of that individual's
capacity to occupy the position. 4 Public Law No. 96-458 is a hybrid
of these alternatives. It provides for a judicial tribunal with the
authority to rule on the fitness of a particular judge, but without
the power to actually remove a jurist from the bench. Although
this provision was signed into law on October 15, 1980, similar pro1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.6; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane, Sept. 6, 1819, in XV THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 213 (A. Bergh ed. 1907). Viscount James Bryce compared
impeachment to, "a hundred-ton gun which needs complex machinery to bring it into position, an enormous charge of powder to fire it, and a large mark to aim at." V. BRYCE, THE
AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 233 (1908).
3. See notes 6-16 and accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 17-37 and accompanying text infra.
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posals have been unable to pass constitutional muster.
Each of these three types of proposals will be discussed in turn
and will be examined for constitutional infirmities.
A. Removal by Abolition
The first assault of the judiciary was the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801,6 by which the incoming administration of President Thomas Jefferson sought to eliminate several judgeships created in the twilight of John Adams' administration.
By the end of John Adams' term in 1800, the Federalist party,
which had been the majority party since Washington's presidency,
was losing ground to the increasingly popular Jeffersonians. Having previously gained control of the executive and legislative
branches, the Federalists turned to the judiciary to complete their
trilogy of political influence.7
Adams sought to institutionalize Federalist political thought
beyond the tenancy of his administration by creating several new
Federalist-appointed federal judgeships. To achieve this end, Adams signed into law the Judiciary Act of 1801.8 The Act was passed
by Congress at the last moment, and many "midnight" appointments were hastily executed. This less-than-subtle maneuver to
leave a legacy of Federalist politics in the judiciary did not go unchallenged by the Jeffersonians.
Jefferson, soon after taking office, sponsored the repeal of the
Judiciary Act. The effect of such an enactment was the removal of
the newly appointed federal judges without impeachment. Jefferson argued that Congress' power to create inferior courts, by implication, included the ability to abolish those courts.9
The debate, however, focused on the real issue: the constitutionality of abolishing newly created judgeships and thereby extinguishing by legislative action other than impeachment the tenure,
albeit only hours old, of the judges. 10 The Jeffersonians ultimately
5. Id.
6. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801).
7. The Federalists' success was inevitably accompanied by criticism from the minority
party, especially since the new republic had been founded on principles of decentralization
of power. The Jeffersonian minority had come to regard the federal courts as "a political
adjunct of the hated Federalists." F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT 20-21, 23-25 (1927), quoted in Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal
Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. CH. L. REV. 665, 670 (1969).
8. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801).
9. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8,cl.
9.
10. For a full discussion of the various arguments, see Kurland, supra note 7, at 670-
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prevailed, and the courts which were created by the Judiciary Act
were abolished.11
The repeal of the Judiciary Act is significant, not only because
it was the first attempt to control the growing power of the judiciary, but also because it underscores the political motivation
which
12
typically characterizes attempts to remove federal judges.

Typical of the political pressure exerted in attempted judicial
removal is Congressman Bingham's proposals to the Civil War Reconstruction Congress to retire federal judges at a specified age, or
upon evidence of incompetency, and to allow the President to
nominate and appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
an additional judge to "hold" the court until the other stepped
down.13 Bingham, recognizing the constitutional tenure of federal
judges, attempted to do indirectly what could not be done directly.
In response, his colleague, Congressman Kerr, pointed out:
[I]f it is competent for Congress to enact such a provision as this,
then it is equally competent for Congress to say that after a judge
shall have attained the age of sixty years or fifty years or forty
years, he may in like manner be retired or superseded or may be
aided by the appointment of another judge who shall sit with
him, dividing with him his jurisdiction-dividing with him every
11. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801). The Federalists would claim the
lasting victory, however. Federalist Chief Justice Marshall's precedential opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), through upholding Jefferson's repeal of the
Judiciary Act, at the same time established the doctrine of judicial review. This doctrine
assured that the Federalist-dominated Supreme Court would have the last word on federal
legislation.
12. It is noteworthy that having succeeded in the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801,
Jefferson attempted to remove the Federalist judges who remained by virtue of the earlier
Judiciary Act of 1789 via the conventional impeachment process. Although Jefferson was
successful in the impeachment of District Judge John Pickering of New Hampshire, he became quite frustrated with the impeachment process when his attempt to oust associate
Justice Samuel Chase from the Supreme Court failed. See Holloman, The JudicialReform
Act: History, Analysis, and Comment, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 128, 130 (1970). "The
failure to convict Chase on even one count was a major setback to the political plans of the
Republicans." Dillard, Samuel Chase, in I THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
CouRT 1789-1969. "Everyone recognized that if the impeachment of Chase resulted in his
removal, this trial would be but the curtain-raiser to the trial of Chief Justice Marshall,
whose recent decision in Marbury v. Madison had greatly affronted Jefferson." H G.
HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 849, 851 n.10 (1938).
13. This "additional judge" would "have the same power and perform the same duties
and receive the same compensation as the judge then acting in such court, or who shall be
retired and excused from so acting, and shall, in connection with or in the absence of his
senior associate, hold the courts prescribed by law for said senior or retired judge ... and
upon his ceasing for any cause to hold said office, the said additional judge appointed under
the provisions of this act shall be and become the judge of such court." CONG. GLOBE, 41st
Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (1869).
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one of the functions of his office, until, if this process be continued, the court, so far as this new organization is concerned, will
become a mockery of a judicial tribunal.14
This legislation failed, and the question of the tenure of federal judges lay dormant until President Wilson tried to abolish the
Commerce Court in 1912. Predictably, the tenure of federal judges
was touted as a secondary consideration in the elimination of the
court. The real issue, the proponents of the measure claimed, was
the existence of a court established for the sole purpose of reviewing the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Again,
the proposal was of a highly political nature and was controversial
from its inception. President Wilson ultimately won. A year after
the court's creation it "was already on its death bed, 1 5 and a year
later it was put to rest.
Although an initial version of the bill sought to abolish the
judgeships as well as the court-invoking the specter of the 1801
repeal-the final version abolished only the court. The tough question of the constitutionality of judicial removal was thus subsequently avoided."'
B.

Removal by Judicial Tribunal

The next attempt to exert political control over the tenure of
federal judges came to fruition in the tension-charged atmosphere
of New Deal Washington when President Franklin Roosevelt, frustrated by the Supreme Court's repeated rulings against his eco1
nomic recovery legislation, proposed his "court packing" plan. 7
President Roosevelt's plan would have required federal judges
and justices with ten years of service to retire upon reaching the
age of seventy. If a judge refused to retire, the legislation required
the President to appoint another judge to preside over the affairs
of the court and to have precedence over the older judge. With
three of the nine Roosevelt-era Justices over seventy years old, had
the court-packing plan been enacted, Roosevelt would have been
assured of a pro-New Deal majority." Whether coincidentally or
14. Id. at 341-42.
15. Kurland, supra note 7, at 683.
16. The debate over the abolition of the Commerce Court rekindled the larger issue of
political control over the Judiciary. See, e.g., S. Doc. Nos. 292, 302, 348, 406, 408, 451, 452,
472, 473, 892, 941, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912); S. Doc. Nos. 1075, 1106, 1108, 62d Cong., 3d
Sess. (1913).
17. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan,
1966 Sup. CT. REv. 347, 390.
18. Id. at 373. Like President Jefferson before him, Roosevelt, during his 1932 presi-
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through concern about self-preservation, the Supreme Court began
to uphold New Deal legislation soon after the announcement of
Roosevelt's plan, and the power of popular appeal to reform the
Supreme Court was never tested.19
However, the episode left its mark in the form of substitute
proposals to remove judges by challenging their competency before
judicial tribunals. Senate Bill 4527 was the 20first legislation introduced to create a judicial disciplinary body.
Though Senate Bill 4527 failed to generate the expected controversy, House Resolution 2271, known as the Sumners Bill because it had been introduced by Hatton Sumners, 21 Chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee, received a great deal of attention. 2 The Bill provided for a judicial court which would determine the merits of a claim accusing a federal district judge of activities "other than good behavior within the meaning of that term
as used in section 1 of article III of the Constitution."2 Upon a
dential campaign, had criticized Republican control of "all branches of the government-the
Legislature, with the Senate and Congress; and the executive departments; and I may add,
for full measure, to make it complete, the United States Supreme Court as well." 1 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 837
(1941).

19. Widespread public contempt for the Supreme Court during the early Roosevelt
years has since been unparalleled. The Court became known as "that body of nine old hasbeens, half-deaf, half-blind, full-of-palsy men." Leuchtenburg, supra note 17, at 366. The
snowballing support for the Court-packing scheme has been discussed by several commentators. See, e.g., Ervin, Separation of Powers: JudicialIndependence, 35 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 108, 131 (1970); Kurland, supra note 7, at 687; Ross, "Good Behavior" of Federal
Judges, 12 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 119 (1944).
20. Although S.B. 4527 was the first congresional proposal to suggest a judicial disciplinary body, the concept is credited by Professor Ross, supra note 19, at 119, to Professor
Burke Shartel. See Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution,28 MICH. L. REV. 870 (1930). Beginning
with the premise that impeachment is an ineffective means of removing misfit judges, Shartel, noting similar mechanisms in other countries, particularly France and Germany, id. at
876, submitted the proposition that impeachment was designed to restrict the power of Congress over judges, but did not preclude judicial removal of their own members. This proposition initiated a forty-year debate on whether or not impeachment is the sole method of
removal for federal judges. The foremost opponent of the Shartel theory and its resulting
legislation was federal District Judge and legal scholar Merrill E. Otis, who entered the fray
in his frequently cited article. See Otis, A Proposed Tribunal: Is It Constitutional?, 7 U.
KAN. CITY L. REv. 3 (1938). The paper debate between Shartel and Otis could have been
dismissed as a mere academic exercise had it not been for the resulting deluge of legislation
which continually revived the issue.
21. Democrat, Texas, 1913-1947.
22. It was the Sumners Bill which preoccupied Judge Otis in his well-regarded commentary. Otis, supra note 20, at 6.
23. H.R. 2271, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). The text also appears in Otis, supra note
20, at 11-12.
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determination that the judge had been "misbehaving," the court
was authorized to have the judge removed. Appeal was permitted
to the Supreme Court. The distinctive features of this bill were its
utilization of the "good behavior" standard as a measuring stick
for removal2 4 and its limitation to district judges. 25 The bill passed

the House of Representatives 221 to 125 but died when it was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.2
By 1965, when Senator Joseph D. Tydings of Maryland was
appointed Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, the fires of judicial reform were again
well stoked. Both California and New York had by constitutional
amendment2 7 created' mechanisms within their judiciaries to remove judges, and other states were not far behind.2 8 In 1962, Joseph Borkin published The Corrupt Judge,29 which examined the
problems of arresting judicial misbehavior within the confines of
an increasingly cumbersome impeachment process. A year later, a
revealing article in the Wall Street Journal focused public attention on the conflict of interest which existed between federal
judges who served on boards of directors of banks and corporations
while regularly presiding over cases involving those corporations.
24. The good behavior standard proved to be as vexatious and controversial as was the
concept of impeachment for the exclusive means of removal. See notes 76-99 and accompanying text infra.
25. Later bills would extend to circuit judges and ultimately to Supreme Court Justices. Public Law No. 96-458 extends both to circuit and district judges as well as to bankruptcy judges and United States magistrates. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980).
26. Kurland, supra note 7, at 693. The bill had garnered the support both of the Assembly of the American Bar Association, Holloman, supra note 12, at 132, and of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The support from the Judicial Conference avoided the
difficult issues upon its recommendation, which stated: "Assuming its constitutionality,as
to which we express no opinion, we are in accord with the general purpose and approve in
principle the provisions embodied in H.R. 9160." JudicialConference of the United States,
Proc. 23 (1940) (emphasis added). Although philosophical support was growing, constitutional opposition was snowballing. See Editorials, 27 A.B.A.J. 163, 552 (1941); Letter from
Francis Biddle to Congressman Hatton W. Sumners, June 24, 1941, in Hearingson H.R. 146
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,77th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1941). Justice Jackson
supported the bill in theory but declined to express an opinion as to its constitutionality. Id.
at 25-31.
27. CAL. CONsT. art. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 9, renumbered Sept. 1, 1962, as art. VI,
§ 22.
28. Forty-nine jurisdictions (fifty-one if the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are
included) have some form of judicial conduct commission. Cameron, The California Supreme Court Hearings-A Tragedy That Should and Could Have Been Avoided, 8 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 11, 12 (1980).
29. J. BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE (1962).
30. Landauer, Extra-JudicialActivity, Wall Street Journal, May 2, 1963, at 1, col. 1.
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Similar questions of ethics also were raised in Congress."'
Senator Tydings subsequently announced the initiation of a
study on suggested judicial reform, including a proposed constitutional amendment, to satisfy the growing public sentiment against
an apparently abusive, yet unaccountable, judiciary. Within the
next four years, the Judicial Reform Act3 2 was introduced in the
Ninety-first Congress. Title I of the Act proposed the establishment of a Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure whose
function would be to recommend removal of federal judges from
office for misbehavior or disability. Extensive hearings were conducted on both the desirability and the constitutionality of this
proposal.3 3

Notwithstanding the support of numerous legal scholars,34 the
31. For a discussion of the Bobby Baker case with the resulting creation of an Ethics
Committee and Code of Ethics in Congress, see Holloman, supra note 12, at 133-34.
32. The Judicial Reform Act, S. 1506, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
33. Hearings on S. 1506 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Hearings on the
Independence of Federal Judges Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
34. During this period, three future Supreme Court Justices, Warren E. Burger, William Rehnquist and Harry A. Blackmun, suggested in extrajudicial statements that no constitutional prohibitions stood in the way of Senator Tydings' Judicial Reform Act.
Testifying at hearings on the confirmation of his nomination, Chief Justice (then Circuit Judge) Burger indicated, in response to a question from Senator Tydings, sponsor of S.
1506, that a conflict had "never occurred to me" between the separation-of-power concept of
the Constitution and the provision in Tydings' legislation for judicial discipline of judges.
Hearingson the Nomination of Warren E. Burger to be Chief Justice of the United States
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1969), quoted in Holloman, supra note 12, at 138 n.70. It is unclear, however, whether these remarks reflect a view
of the constitutionality of such legislation generally or merely reflect the view that it would
not infringe the separation-of-powers theory. More recently, Chief Justice Burger seemed to
adopt a different position: "This explains why the Constitution expressly provided that all
Federal Judges would hold office during good behaviour, subject to removal only by impeachment processes in the House and Senate." The Chief Justice on the Bicentennial,48
N.Y.S.B.J. 280, 282-83 (1976).
Then Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist, testifying on behalf of the Department of
Justice in 1970, indicated the belief of the Department that the provisions of the Tydings
bill relating to "a new judicial commission to remove judges in case of failure to conform
with the good behavior standards of the Constitution are constitutionally permissible."
Hearings on the Independence of Federal Judges Before the Subcomm. on Separationof
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 330 (1970). Mr. Rehnquist discussed the Justice Department's views at some length at the hearings. Id. at 350-51.
Justice Blackmun had expressed his view during his confirmation hearings, Hearingson
Nomination of Harry A. Blackmun to be Associate Justice Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1970), quoted in part in Holloman, supra note 12, at
142. Blackmun's statement does not address the constitutionality of Tydings' legislation but
relates only to the threat to judicial independence generally and seems to focus primarily on
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bill met vigorous opposition. Senator Tydings' defeat in 1970 once
again relegated the judicial tenure concept to obscurity, until a
new congressman appeared to take up the cause15 -Senator Sam
Nunn of Georgia. Motivated by the Watergate scandal, Nunn introduced new judicial tenure legislation in both the Ninety-third
and the Ninety-fourth Congresses. The 1976 version of the Judicial
Tenure Act 6 was virtually identical to its predecessors, except that
the proposal encompassed all federal judges, including Supreme
Court Justices. 7
The constitutional objections to passage of the new legislation
were fundamentally the same as those which confronted Thomas
Jefferson when he sought to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801.
Stumbling blocks to the bill's passage included the constitutional
hurdle of the seeming exclusivity of the impeachment mechanism,
the difficulties involved in defining "good behavior," and the potential encroachment upon the constitutional mandate of an independent judiciary.
The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 sought to avoid these problems by more carefully
framing the issues to be addressed. The result was a different hybrid approach, which borrowed the least objectionable features of
previous proposals in an effort to pass constitutional muster.
C.

A Hybrid Approach

Public Law No. 96-458, The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,8 is the first judicial tenexisting means of discipline such as 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1970).

35. Boyd, FederalJudges: To Whom Must They Answer?, 61 A.B.A.J. 324, 325 (1975).
36. The Judicial Tenure Act, S. 1110, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Extensive hearings
were held on this second round of modern judicial tenure legislation, but the debates did

not resolve the important issues, and S. 1110 did not pass. With the constitutional, issues
still unresolved, the bill was reincarnated in the 95th Congress as S. 1423 and in the 96th

Congress as S. 295. Neither bill survived committee approval.
37.

This inclusion of the Supreme Court interjected a new element of controversy. A

strong contingent, led by the Judicial Council of the United States, rejected the concept of
removal for either judges or Justices. Hearings on S. 1110, The JudicialTenure Act, Before

the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1976) at 73 (statement of Hon. Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., 5th

Cir. Judge) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings]. The other side, led by Professor Raoul
Berger, felt that the Justices of the Supreme Court must be included, based on philosophical equalitarianism. "I don't for a minute admit that Justices are beyond criticism....
Bear in mind, what they [the proponents of exclusion] are really talking about is sort of an

Emily Post etiquette; they are not talking about constitutional barriers." Id. at 104-05
(statement of Raoul Berger).
38. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980).
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ure act to provide for discipline, short of removal, predicated on a
standard of conduct other than good behavior."9
The primary purpose of the Act is to create a mechanism and
procedures within the judicial branch of government to consider
and respond to complaints against federal judges. 40 Secondarily,
however, the Act has redefined the functions and powers of the
judicial councils of the federal judicial circuits to vest in these bodies the responsibility for judicial discipline and disability.
Procedurally, the Act provides that any person can file a written complaint against any federal judge except Supreme Court
Justices. 41 The complaint must allege that a judge is or has been
unable to discharge efficiently the duties of his or her office by reason of mental or physical disability, or that he or she is engaging or
has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts. 2
The required basis for a complaint is intended to discourage a
disgruntled litigant who is unhappy with the result of a particular
case from challenging the fitness of the presiding judge. 4 The effective and expeditious administration standard can include, but is
not limited to, willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent
failure to perform duties of the office, habitual intemperance, or
other conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which
brings the judicial office into disrepute. Further, a complaint may
incorporate impeachable behavior or violations of the criminal laws
39. The constitutional barriers posed by the grant of good behavior tenure are acknowledged by the proponents of Pub. L. No. 96-458. "There is at this time, little evidence

in the Constitution or in the debates on its framing and adoption which supports a thesis
that the Framers intended 'good Behaviour' to be a vessel into which future Congresses
could pour substantive and changing definitions and undermine the integrity of tenure
which clearly was regarded by the Framers as essential to protecting the independence of

judges and disinterestedness of judicial review."

HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, JUDICIAL
COUNCILS REFORM AND JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT oF 1980, H.R. REP. No. 1313,

96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1980) (fn. omitted).
40. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 39.

41. "It should be noted that the proposed legislation does not provide for the disciplining of Supreme Court Justices. There are two reasons for this intentional exclusion.
First, high public visibility of Supreme Court Justices makes it [far] more likely that im-

peachment can and should be used to cure egregious situations. Second, it would be unwise
to empower an institution such as the Judicial Conference, which actually is chaired by the

Chief Justice of the United States, to sit on cases involving the highest ranking judges in our
judicial system. The independence and importance of the Supreme Court within our justice

system should not be diluted in this fashion." Id. at 10, n.28.
42. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-458 § 3(a)(c)(1), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980).
43. S. REP. No. 362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979).
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of any state or of the United States."
The complaint is filed directly with the judicial council of the
circuit to which the accused judge belongs and is then transmitted
to the chief judge of the circuit. A copy of the complaint is also
transmitted to the judge or magistrate whose conduct is the subject of the complaint. 45 The chief judge then may dismiss the complaint or may determine that the allegations meet the standards
for misconduct or disability. In the latter case, the chief judge shall
refer the complaint to a committee appointed by himself, consisting of an equal number of circuit and district judges and the chief
judge.46
This committee is empowered to conduct an investigation "as
extensive as it considers necessary," 7 and then must submit a report of its findings and recommendations to the judicial council of
the circuit. The council then will conduct any necessary additional
investigation, and is empowered to take such action to assure the
"effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts," including, but not limited to, certifying disability or requesting voluntary retirement. Further, the council can temporarily prevent cases from being assigned to the judge involved. The
council also can censure or reprimand the judge, publicly or privately. Finally, the council can "order such actions as it considers
appropriate under the circumstances, except that . . . in no circumstances may the council order removal from office." 4 8
If either the complainant or the judge or magistrate involved
wishes to challenge the final order of the chief judge, he or she may
do so by petitioning the judicial council. If a party is dissatisfied
with the decision of the judicial council, it may petition the Judicial Conference of the United States for review. All determinations
of the Judicial Conference are final and conclusive. No further review is available.49
44. Id. at 9.
45. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 3(a)(2), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980).
46. Id. at § 3(a)(4).
47. Id. at § 3(a)(5).
48. Id. at § 3(a)(6)(B)(vii). U.S. magistrates and judges not appointed to hold office
with good behavior tenure, such as a Court of Claims judge, nevertheless may be removed
under this provision.
49. S. 1873 originally would have established a new Court on Judicial Conduct and
Disability, a court of record composed of district and circuit judges, to pass judgment on the
action of the judicial council and to dismiss, affirm, modify or reverse its orders as it saw fit.
During the House hearings, this provision was dropped in order to emphasize that primary
administrative responsibillity was to be placed within the judicial branch. Further, such a
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If the Judicial Conference determines that a judge's conduct
warrants impeachment, it must submit
its findings to the House of
50
Representatives for further action.

The Act provides that all proceedings and complaints before
the committee are to be kept strictly confidential unless the accused judge expressly consents to their release, or unless the judicial council, the Judicial Conference or Congress releases any material which is believed necessary to an impeachment
investigation.5 1
Public Law No. 96-458, by creating sanctions short of removal,
has sought to avoid the issue of whether the constitutional impeachment mechanism is the only permissible manner of removing
judges from the federal bench. Several questions remain, however,
which will be discussed in turn. Are the sanctions permitted by the
Act precluded by the Constitution as well? If the impeachment
mechanism is exclusive, then it may preclude lesser sanctions as
well as sanctions having the equivalent effect of removing the
judge from the bench. Further, there are serious constitutional
problems with regard to judicial independence in empowering the
judicial councils with the responsibility for disciplining federal
judges. Finally, the implications of judicial self-discipline with respect to the integrity of the system as a whole must be examined-the recent experience of the California Judicial Commission investigations provides a telling reference.

A.

II. Constitutional Issues
Impeachment as the Sole Method of Removal

The United States Constitution specifies that removal of civil
officers of the United States is to be accomplished by impeachment.5 2 The House of Representatives is granted the "sole power

of impeachment, ' 53 and the Senate is granted "the sole power to
try all impeachments. ' ' 54 Whether or not the constitutional provi-

sions concerning removal by impeachment preclude removal or dis-

court, which envisioned a formal adversarial proceeding, was seen as raising the dangers of a
substantial chilling effect on judicial independence as well as inflicting harm and disruption
on the administration of justice. See H.R. REP. No. 1313, supra note 39, at 4, 18.
50. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 3(a)(8), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980).
51. Id. at § 3(a)(14).
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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cipline short of removal has been the subject of considerable
debate.
Judge Merrill E. Otis, an ardent proponent of the exclusivist
view, concluded that "he who has the text alone has enough to
make it clear that Congress does not have the power to create a
court for the trial of judges for misconduct, with the jurisdiction to
remove them. By necessary implication the Constitution prohibits
the exercise of such power by Congress." 5
Two additional arguments in favor of impeachment as the sole
means of discipline have traditionally been advanced. The first is
that the constitutional maxim of construction, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius,56 limits judicial removal to impeachment since
impeachment is the only removal mechanism for which the Constitution provides. The second is that the word "sole," used only in
the impeachment provisions, precludes other means of removal.57
In support of these arguments, the exclusivists rely heavily on
the perceived intentions of the Framers of the Constitution. The
most direct historical support for the exclusivist view is found in
Alexander Hamilton's FederalistPaperNo. 79:
The precautions for their [judges'] responsibility are comprised in
the article respecting impeachments. They are liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House of Representatives, and
tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed from office, and disqualified for holding any other. This is the only provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary indepen55.

Otis, supra note 20, at 21. Many commentators have agreed. See, e.g., Battisti, The

Independence of the FederalJudiciary, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 421 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Independence of the Federal Judiciary];Battisti, An Independent Judiciaryor an
Evanescent Dream, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 711 (1975); Boyd, supra note 35; Ervin, supra
note 19; Holloman, supra note 12; Kramer & Barron, The Constitutionalityof Removal and
Mandatory Retirement Proceduresfor the Federal Judiciary: The Meaning of "During
Good Behaviour," 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455 (1967); Kurland, supra note 7; Ross, supra
note 19; Stolz, DiscipliningFederal Judges: Is Impeachment Hopeless?, 57 CALIF. L. REV.
659 (1969); Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution:English and American
Precedents, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 135; Note, The Exclusiveness of the Impeachment Power
Under the Constitution, 51 HARv. L. REV. 330 (1937); Note, Disability as Grounds for Impeachment, 85 YALE L.J. 706 (1976); Comment, Judicial Responsibility-Statutory and
Constitutional Problems Relating to Methods for Removal or Discipline of Judges, 21
RUTGERS L. REV. 153 (1966); Comment, The Chandler Incident and Problems of Judicial
Removal, 19 STAN. L. REV. 448 (1967).
56. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY
521 (5th ed. 1979).
57. "It is well known, and often has it been said by the highest courts, that every word
of the Constitution was intended to have significance. If that is true of any word, it is especially true of the strong word--'sole' ..
used twice only in the Constitution." Otis, supra
note 20, at 25.
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dence of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find
in our own Constitution in respect to our own judges.
The want of a provision for removing the judges on account
of inability has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate
men will be sensible that such a provision would either not be
practiced upon or would be more liable to abuse than calculated
to answer any good purpose.58
In addition, the records of the debates of the various state ratification conventions do not suggest that the Constitution authorized
Congress to provide an alternate means of removal other than
impeachment.5 9
The nonexclusivist school of thought contends that impeachment is only one means of removal. Proponents of this view discount the "intentions of the Framers" argument by pointing out
inconsistencies in the constitutional debate commentaries.6 0 Additionally, the nonexclusivists point to the First Congress' Act of
17901 which provided that, upon a conviction in a court for brib62
ery, a judge shall be "forever. . .disqualified to hold any office.
The nonexclusivists argue that disqualification is tantamount to
removal in the sense that it limits judicial tenure.63 Because this
limitation is by a means other than impeachment, this early conact is said to provide an alternate method of judicial
gressional
64
removal.
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (A. Hamilton) 473-74 (Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis
added). Hamilton was a strong proponent of removal by impeachment alone, see III M.
FARRAUD,THE RECORD OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 625 (1934), a position which
has subjected his commentary to the criticism that it is unfounded. Shartel, supra note 20,
at 896 n.71.
59. Otis, supra note 20, at 7.
60. Nonexclusivists point also to The Federalist Papers No. 79, where Hamilton appears, despite his previously "absolute" stance, to believe that judges may be removed for
insanity. "[In response to providing removal for inability], [t]he measuration of the faculties
of the mind has, I believe, no place in the catelogue [sic] of known acts. An attempt to fix
the boundary between the regions of ability and inability, would much oftener give scope to
personal and party attachments and enmities than advance the interests of justice or the
public good. The result, except in the case of insanity, must for the most part be arbitrary;,
and insanity, without any formal or express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a
virtual disqualification." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 50, at 474.
61. Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 21, I Stat. 117 (1790).
62. Id.
63. "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal
7.
from office, and disqualification to hold any office." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.
64.

R.

BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

156 (1973). The ex-

clusivists rebut this argument with two objections. First, they dispute the assumption that
disqualification is indeed equivalent to removal. Second, they question the validity of the
statute which has never been enforced. See Hearings on the Independence of Federal

Judges Before the Subcomm. on Separationof Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
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Further, the nonexclusivists point out that the language of the
Constitution does not explicitly provide that impeachment is to be
an exclusive device and caution against excessive reliance on expressio unius est exclusio alterius, as such maxims are merely
rules of construction and are not binding rules of law. 5
Finally, the nonexclusivists rely on the existence of a separate
power to remove judicial officers for less than impeachable conduct. That power is said to be the English common-law writ of
scire facias.
Scire facias came into use in England after 1701 when the Act
of Settlement eliminated judicial tenure at the pleasure of the
King and provided judges with tenure "during good behavior." 6
This English common-law writ was a judicial method of removal
the bases of which were misconduct in office, neglect of duties, acceptance
of an incompatible office, or conviction of a serious
7
crime.

The nonexclusivists contend that article III, section 1 of the
Constitution specifically grants good behavior tenure to federal
judges.68 That section is argued to have its origin in the English
historical concept of good behavior tenure and therefore to include
ary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (statements of Peter G. Fish), quoted in Ervin, supra note
19, at 118.
65. R. BERGER, supra note 64, at 138. The most common example cited where expressio unius is not recognized is in the allowance of jury trials for civil cases. The Constitution
does not expressly provide for jury trials in civil cases, yet it does expressly provide for jury
trials in criminal cases. If expressio unius were to be strictly applied, then the express mention of criminal jury trials would therefore exclude any other type of jury trials. It is agreed
that the Framers did not intend this result; therefore, the "existing powers" argument has
been advanced to overcome the expressio unius maxim.
66. By the time of the Norman Conquest in England, the once "communal" courts had
been linked to the offices of the King so that the King became, in a sense, the "fountain of
justice." McIlwain, The Tenure of English Judges, 7 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 217, 218 (1913). At
this time, Judges, as did other royal officials, held their commissions in one of two forms.
The most common form was durante bene placito domino Rege (during the King's pleasure), a purely executive power of removal. The power derived from patents issued on the
holder of the office. The King was the issuer of all patents and possessed the ability to
revoke them at will.
The second form, quamdiu se bene gesserit--"duringgood behavior"-was not extensively utilized until the Act of Settlement in 1701 which provided that "Judges' commissions
be made quamdiu se bene gesserit and their salaries ascertained and established but upon
Address of both Houses of Parliament it may be lawful to remove them." 12 & 13 Will. III,
c. 2, § 3 (1700).
67. See Shartel, supra note 20, at 900 n.82.
68. A detailed discussion of the separate standard for good behavior appears at notes
76-99 and accompanying text infra.
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the ancient writ of scire facias.as
The nonexclusivists argue that the availability of scire facias
removal is a pre-existing power-first, it was not expressly eliminated by the Framers themselves; second, although impeachment
was expressly provided for in the Constitution for high crimes and
misdemeanors, scire facias was intended to be the appropriate

remedy for that judicial misconduct which was in violation of the
good behavior standard but did not rise to an impeachable offense;
finally, scire facias was the basis of good behavior tenure at common law. As good behavior is expressly provided for by the Constitution, the nonexclusivists argue, Congress can, through the necessary and proper clause, provide a remedy to terminate a judge for
misbehavior.70
The major objection of the exclusivists to the scire facias argument is that even if it can be said to exist, it is irrelevant in the
discussion of removal of federal judges. At no time in English history was a judge comparable to an American federal judge removed
by a writ of scire facias.71 Further, at no time during the constitutional convention, was the writ of scire facias mentioned, whereas
impeachment was explicitly (and, they contend, solely) delineated.
The other known English legislative means of removal wer6 specifi69. Scire facias, however, was not an innovation of the Act of Settlement; rather it
had existed prior to the Act as a method of removal for judges and other civil officers holding good behavior tenure. It did not become significant, however, until after the Act, since
most appointments were for "the King's pleasure," a tenure for which scire facias was not
available. Good behavior tenure proceeded on the theory that an officer had been issued a
patent, similar to a property interest in land, which imparted an estate for life terminable
only upon death or "breach of good behavior." R. BERGER, supra note 64, at 125-26. A writ
of scire facias constituted a forfeiture of the patent. The writ brought by the issuer of the
patent, was determined in a judicial proceeding, and was predicated upon misbehavior. Literally, a Lord bringing a writ of scire facias would say to the court, "I beg to have a declaration that this office be forfeited." Judges and other officers holding a good behavior patent
from the King were removable on scire facias in the King's Bench. An additional writ, quo
warranto,was conceptually identical to a writ of scire facias yet was available only for persons in lower positions not holding a patent from the King. Cf. Comment, Removal of Federal Judges-New Alternatives to an Old Problem: Chandler v. Judicial Council of the
Tenth Circuit, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1385, 1396 n.43 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Removal of
FederalJudges] (suggesting that quo warrantohas replaced scire facias).
70. R. BERGER, supra note 64, at 132-33.
71. Otis, supra note 20, at 49. The nonexclusivists acknowledge this point but submit
that it has no bearing on the judicial power to remove judges, an argument which is pivotal
as to the availability of judicial discipline. R. BERGER, supra note 64, at 127-28. Additionally, the nonexclusivists cite in rebuttal two occasions when high English judges refused to
be removed without a scire facias proceeding; yet in neither instance was the writ actually
exercised. These incidents involved Sir John Walter, Chief Barron of the Exchequer in 1628
and Sir John Archer, Justice of the Common Pleas in 1672. R. BERGER, supra note 64, at
128-29.
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cally rejected.7 2
In addition to the question of viability of scire facias at the
time of the constitutional convention, there is a legitimate question
of the Framers' knowledge of the writ.73 Even if their knowledge is
assumed, a legitimate question arises as to its conspicuous absence
in the debates. Ultimately, however, scire facias is in direct conflict
with the specific provision for the admittedly cumbersome removal
by impeachment.7 4 It is incongruous that such a difficult and circumscribed method of removal could be circumvented by the ad72. Although the ability of the executive to remove a judicial officer unconditionally
had been eliminated, four alternate methods were still available in the English constitutional system. Three were legislative and one judicial. The three legislative forms of removal
were Bill of Attainder (Bill of Pains and Penalties), removal by Address to the King (a joint
resolution by Parliament for which cause need not be shown), and removal by impeachment.
The writ of scire facias was the judicial method of removal.
Removal by Address was rejected at the Constitutional Convention. II M. FARRAND,
THE RECORD OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 428-29 (1934). Bills of Attainder are
expressly prohibited by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. The nonexclusivist response, however, is that rejection of legislative methods of removal does not imply rejection
of judicial methods of removal. R. BERGER, supra note 64, at 152-53.
73. It is acknowledged that the Framers were sophisticated and learned men, but even
if they can be said to have been aware of the writ, there is no evidence of their intent that it
be extended to judges to whom it had never been applied. Although John Adams suggested
the general ignorance of his colleagues even of the impeachment process, Berger suggests
that it was not ignorance of impeachments but lack of power to impeach in the colonies
which would account for Adams' statement. R. BERGER, supra note 64, at 143.
Scire facias is considered by some to be available in England even today. See R. BERGER, supra note 64, at 130; Ross, supra note 19, at 122. The fact nonetheless remains that
there has been no instance of scire facias removal in England since the 17th Century. Moreover, all the Framers, among the three who have been considered to be the most knowledgeable in terms of legal practice and scholarship, Jefferson, Hamilton and John Adams, each
believed impeachment to be the exclusive method of removal. See Otis, supra note 20, at 9
n.5 (Jefferson). But see R. BERGER, supra note 64, at 155 n.150, wherein he offers a quotation from which he suggests Jefferson took a contrary view. Jefferson wrote that judges had
been made "independent of the nation itself. They are irremovable, but by their own body,
for any depravities of conduct." Id. The original of the letter, hoWever, makes it clear that in
this statement Jefferson was referring to the judges of Virginia, the constitution of which
explicitly provided for removal of lower court judges by superior court judges. Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 34 (Memorial ed. 1903). Accord, Note, Disability as Grounds for Impeachment,
supra note 55, at 713. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 58, at 474 (Hamilton);
Thoughts on Government, January 1776, SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN AND JOHN QUINCY
ADAMS, 50, 55-56 (Koch & Peden ed. 1946) (Adams).
74. Exclusivists and nonexclusivists alike recognize the cumbersome nature of impeachment. See R. BERGER, supra note 64, at 122-25, 157; Shartel, supra note 20, at 870-73;
Note, The Exclusiveness of the Impeachment Power Under the Constitution, supra note
55, at 332 n.10 (citing sources); Comment, Removal of FederalJudges, supra note 69, at
1389.
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mittedly simple writ of scire facias.7 5 The resolution of this conflict, however, requires a much more fundamental determination:
What did the Framers intend when they used the words "good
behavior"?
B. Good Behavior as a Separate Standard
Probably the most problematic and irreconcilable constitutional issue in defining the limits of federal judicial tenure is the
meaning of the words "good behavior" in article I, section 1 of
the Constitution. That section states that "[tihe Judges, both of
the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour ....

Legislation which has provided for judicial removal other than
impeachment for conduct "inconsistent with the good behavior
provision of Article III'' " has faced the problem of defining "good
behavior." The authors of the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, recognizing the difficulty
of defining the parameters of a historically nebulous standard,
sought to avoid it altogether by seeking to discipline judges for
conduct "prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts" 78-conduct never adequately defined.79 Regardless of the new label, the intent of Public Law No.
96-458 is to discipline precisely the same class of conduct which
the good behavior standard did not protect: conduct other than
good behavior, "which for the most part fall[s] short of being subject to impeachment."' 0
Conduct of this nature, thought to be unimpeachable, is said
75. "It scarcely can be believed that the Framers intended vesting Congress with an
important power [to provide for removal other than impeachment] and then so skillfully
concealed it [so] it could not be discovered save after 150 years." 81 CONG. REc. 6171 (1937)
(remarks of Emanuel Celler).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
77. See, e.g., S. 295, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1423, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977);
S. 1110, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 1506, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 3055, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. 7423, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H.R. 17, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947); H.R. 1201, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. 1197, 78th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941); H.R.
111 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); H.R. 5939, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); S. 476 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937); H.R. 2271, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); S. 4527, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
78. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 3(a), (c)(1), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980).
79. The vagueness of the standard puts it into the same category as good behavior
tenure which, it has been suggested, could constitute a denial of due process. See Holloman,
supra note 12, at 145; Comment, Removal of Federal Judges, supra note 69, at 1405-06.

80. THE JUDcIAL CONDUCT Am DIsABmrr ACT OF 1979, S. REP. No. 362, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as JUDIcALm CoNDUCT ACT REPORT].
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to fall into a gap between what should constitute good behavior
and what the Constitution sets forth as a high crime or misdemeanor. That certain forms of inappropriate behavior appear to be
immune from punishment is the strongest argument in favor of alternative means of discipline."'
Whereas exclusivists view federal judges as possessing constitutionally guaranteed life tenure, conditioned on good behavior
and subject to termination only by impeachment, nonexclusivists
stress a common-law interpretation of good behavior, distinct in
character from impeachable offenses. The discrepancy becomes relevant even in light of Public Law No. 96-458 which, while not
utilizing the good behavior standard, would permit judicial discipline for conduct which does "not rise to the level of impeachable
offenses. '8 2 Regardless of semantics, both standards are based on
the fundamental assumption that judicial discipline short of impeachment is permissible under the Constitution.
The nonexclusivists' major premise is based upon the constitutional provision for two separate standards of conduct for federal
judges. The first, "impeachable conduct," consists of the commission, of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors."" The second is that
conduct which falls short of impeachment, yet constitutes a departure from good behavior. The common-law definition of good behavior is relied upon for this second standard. A violation of good
behavior at common law demanded a writ of scire facias as a
remedy."'
The nonexclusivists constitutionally justify the existence of
good behavior tenure, and its corresponding remedy of scire facias,
in two ways. First, without a specific remedy, the words "good behavior" are useless.8 5 A compelling rule of construction is that
81. One of the leading nonexclusivists, Professor Raoul Berger, has focused extensively
on the good behavior "gap." In his work on federal impeachments, Berger begins his analysis by distinguishing impeachment, a legislative trial strictly circumscribed, from good behavior as a judicial forfeiture proceeding unrelated to impeachment. R. BERGER, supra note
64 at 124-25.
82. JUDICIAL CONDUCT ACT REPORT, supra note 80, at 3.
83. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
84. See notes 66 & 69 supra.
85. Good behavior tenure became viable with the passage of the Act of Settlement in
1701. The purpose of the Act of Settlement was to make judges independent of the King of
England. Good behavior tenure was a restriction on the King's power over the judiciary and
was not intended as a substantive guarantee of tenure. Further, good behavior tenure was
not to limit a judge's commission by providing additional grounds of removal, but to protect
against arbitrary termination from the King. Breckenridge Mss., Nov. 21, 1801, quoted in
Carpenter, Repeal of the JudiciaryAct of 1801, 9 AM. POL. Scr. REV. 519, 523-26 (1915). By
the time the concept of good behavior tenure reached America, the Framers had developed
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there are no dead words in the Constitution. 6 Second, if the impeachment mechanism is seen as exclusive, no remedy for "gap"
conduct may be fashioned. The practical effect of this would be to
render federal judges immune from punishment for unacceptable
7
8
but unimpeachable behavior.

Did the Framers mean impeachment to be the sole remedy for
judicial misconduct in the Constitution, so that only "treason,
bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors" could result in
loss of tenure? Raoul Berger provides an exhaustive study of this
issue and concludes that the statutory meaning of "high crimes
and misdemeanors" does not include the common-law definition of
misbehavior 8 and that a "gap yawns" between the two. 9 Berger
acknowledges that the Framers did not intend impeachment for
slight offenses as was the case in England.9 0 He contends, however,
that this lack of intent does not by implication preclude a less onerous method of discipline or removal of unimpeachable, yet still
objectionable, offenses. 91
The exclusivists promote an alternate explanation. They consuch a strong desire for full judicial independence that Address and Bill of Attainder were
specifically rejected and, the exclusivists contend, only impeachment as the least arbitrary
means of the three was left as the check for judicial abuse. See JUDimCI CoNDucT AcT REPORT, supra note 80, at 21.
86. R. BERGER, supra note 64, at 131-32. It is not absolute, and therefore, the exclusivists contend, not controlling, that every clause in the Constitution can be enforced.
Specifically, art. I, § 6, cl. 2, § 9, cl. 7 and art. IV, § 4 are not susceptible of enforcement.
87. Although Berger presents a strong analytical case for the distinction between the
two standards, it appears that his primary justification for an alternative remedy lies not in
constitutional considerations but in pragmatic ones. With reference to trials for judicial misconduct, he writes: "Common sense counsels against freezing countless officials into lifetime
appointments, for it would be utterly impracticable to require congressional trials for such a
multitude... weighed against the crucial and tormenting national interests which occupy
the Congressional stage, such issues are really too picayune. We are no less free than Judge
Otis to read another 'necessarily implied exception' into the allegedly exclusive word 'sole,'
for such a reading does not turn on the demands of remorseless logic but on practical considerations to which others may attach more weight than did Otis." R. BERGER, supra note
64, at 137.
88. Good behavior had a rather well-defined meaning at common law, "[good] behaviour means behaviour in matters concerning the office, except in the case of conviction
upon an indictment for any infamous offence of such a nature as to render the person unfit
to exercise the office, which amounts legally to misbehaviour though not committed in connection with the office. 'Misbehaviour' as to the office itself means improper exercise of the
-functions appertaining to the office, or non-attendance, or neglect of or refusal to perform
the duties of the office." 8 E. HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 1107 (4th ed. 1974).
89. R. BERGER, supra note 64, at 162.
90. See id. at 124-25, 132; Independence of the Federal Judiciary,supra note 55, at
447; Shartel, supra note 20, at 871 n.3, 879 n.22, 894 n.70.
91. R. BERGER, supra note 64 at 132-35, 174-80.
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tend that the Framers included the grant of good behavior tenure
in order to distinguish the judges' term of office from that of other
civil officers. Unlike other civil officers, federal judges have a term
of office which is fixed by the Constitution 2 and which is conditioned on good behavior. This distinction confers not only the obvious ability to remove civil officers by means other than impeachment, but is subtle evidence that good behavior tenure can only be
tried in the impeachment forum.9 3 Therefore, there exists a higher
standard of removal for a judge than for his fellow officials.9 4 That

this higher standard is created by and justifies the good behavior
distinction is reflected in the case law.9 5
92. Otis, supra note 20, at 48.
93. See Independence of the FederalJudiciary,supra note 55, at 442; Lawrence, The
Law of Impeachment, 15 A. L. REG. 641, 653 (1867).
94. "The Constitution declares that the judges shall hold their offices during good behavior. This implies that other officers shall hold their offices during a limited time, or according to the will of some person; because if all persons are to hold their offices during
good behavior, and to be removed only by impeachment, then this particulardeclarationin
favor of judges will be useless." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 482 (Lawrence ed. 1834) (emphasis
added).
95. In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839), allowed removal of a civil officer before
expiration of his term, where the tenure was "not fixed" by the Constitution. Id. at 258. See
also Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897), wherein President Cleveland sought to
remove a United States attorney prior to the expiration of his four-year term. Parsons sued
to recover the deficiency in salary which resulted from his untimely dismissal. Relying on In
re Hennen, the United States Supreme Court held that a President has the power to remove
a civil officer prior to the expiration of his appointment. Justice Peckham distinguished an
earlier case, United States v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284 (1854), which involved the
successful removal of a federal judge by the President on the ground that Chief Judge
Goodrich, being a territorial judge (Territory of Minnesota), was an article I judge and did
not fall within the tenure afforded article I judges. With regard to article I judges, the
Court said: "The judges of this class, by the express terms of the constitution, hold their
offices during good behavior. It comprehends the judges of the supreme court, and of the
various judicial circuits and districts to which the United States are [sic] subdivided." Id. at
289.
Parsonswas followed in a similar removal case, Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311
(1903), in which the Court upheld President McKinley's revocation of Shurtleff's appointment as a customs agent. Shurtleff claimed that the President lacked authority, under either
the Constitution or the relevant statute, to remove him. The Court held against Shurtleff,
distinguishing removal of judicial officers from that of other civil servants. "The tenure of
the judicial officers of the United States is provided for by the Constitution, but with that
exception no civil officer has ever held office by a life tenure since the foundation of the
government." Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), involved the-premature removal of a postmaster. In Myers, the act which established the position of postmaster was held to be unconstitutional given that it predicated the President's power of removal upon the senate's
consent. Myers, which firmly established the ability of the executive branch to discipline its
own members, reinforced the position that lesser civil officers are not to be treated like
federal judges on the issue of removal. In dicta, the Court suggested that federal judges
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Even granting that judges possess a "life" or "constitutional"
tenure, the exclusivists argue that this tenure is conditioned upon
good behavior. 96 Impeachment charges, moreover, can be brought
for misbehavior which does not attain a level of high crimes and
high misdemeanors.9
The Senate has twice convicted judges under articles of impeachment that did not charge indictable crimes. The first federal
impeachment was for habitual drunkenness and insanity; the most
recent conviction, the 1936 impeachment of Judge Halsted L. Ritter, was based on behavior which brought the "court into scandal
and disrepute to the prejudice of the said court and public
confidence." 98
The gap between "bad conduct" and impeachable behavior
has created an insurmountable. hurdle for judicial tenure acts
which provide for removal by means other than impeachment.9 9
could be removed only by impeachment. "[Regarding] the removal of judges, whose tenure
is not fixed by Article III of the Constitution, and who are not strictly United States Judges
under that article ... [the] argument is that, as there is no express constitutionalrestriction as to the removal of such judges, they come within the same class as executive officers,
and that statutes and practice in respect of them may properly be used to refute the authority of the legislative decision of 1789 and acquiescence therein. The fact seems to be that
judicial removals were not considered in the discussion in the First Congress, and that the
First Congress ... and succeeding Congresses until 1804, assimilated the judges appointed
for the territories to those appointed under Article III, and provided life tenure for them,
while other officers of those territories were appointed for a term of years unless sooner
removed." Id. at 154-55 (emphasis added).
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), involved removal of a Federal Trade Commissioner appointed for a fixed term. Myers and its predecessors were distinguished only to the extent that those cases involved purely executive officers who could
be removed at will, whereas a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, a "non-partisan. . . , quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative" body, could only be removed upon a showing
of inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office. Id. at 624. The distinction acknowledged, Justice Sutherland reaffirmed the constitutional tenure of federal judges. "In the face
of the unbroken precedent against life tenure, except in the case of the judiciary,the conclusion that Congress intended that, from among all other civil officers, appraisers alone
should be selected to hold office for life was so extreme as to forbid, in the opinion of the
court, any ruling which would produce that result if it reasonably could be avoided." Id. at
623 (emphasis added).
96. This view has also been expressed by the Supreme Court in McAllister v. United
States, 141 U.S. 174 (1891), in which Mr. Justice Harlan suggests for the Court that life
tenure and good behavior are not synonymous. Mr. Justice Field elucidated the conditional
nature of good behavior tenure in his dissent. "In my judgment good behavior during the
term of [an article III judge's] ... appointment is the only lawful and constitutional condition to the retention of his office." Id. at 195 (Field, J., dissenting).
97. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 454 (1976), prohibiting a federal judge from practicing law.
98. Note, The Exclusiveness of the Impeachment Power Under the Constitution,
supra note 55, at 335 n.39.
99. See generally Simpson, Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PENN. L. REv. 803 (1916).
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The avoidance of explicit removal provisions and the "good behavior" language in the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 does not remove these constitutional barriers. That the Act provides a mechanism for judicial
discipline other than impeachment raises the specter of constitutional objections. As long as the central constitutional issues remain unresolved, the legislation is constitutionally unacceptable.
Public Law No. 96-458 has not resolved the basic conflict between good behavior tenure and removal by impeachment-a discrepancy that cannot be reconciled without addressing the difficult
issues of judicial independence.
C. Judicial Independence and the Separation of Powers
A major objective of the Framers of the United States Constitution was to distribute power among the branches of government.
This objective was accomplished by a system of separate powers
and of checks and balances. Apart from these checks, each branch
was conceived as independent. What was meant by independence,
however, is subject to two interpretations.
The nonexclusivists posit a corporate concept of independence. They believe that each branch need only be protected from
interference by the other two branches, but not from itself. A tribunal of judges acting as a disciplinary body for fellow members of
the judiciary is compatible with this interpretation.
The exclusivists take the view that a corporate concept of independence does violence to what is seen as the most compelling
characteristic of the American judiciary: absolute independence.
Absolute independence stresses total independence which is not
limited to separation of powers. From an exclusivist point of view,
therefore, the most offensive element of any type of judicial discipline legislation, whether or not an express provision for actual removal is included, is the element of judicial self-discipline.
The potential dangers of judicial self-discipline cannot be igArticle II, section 4 indicates removal from office on impeachment, as opposed to by
impeachment. It has been contended that removal is only a result of impeachment, and in
fact impeachment proceedings have occurred after actual removal. See 3 A. HiNDs, PREcEDENTS OF riE HousE o0 REPRESENATATIVES § 2006 (1907), a majority, but not two-thirds of
the Senate held that the resignation and its acceptance of William Belknap, Secretary of
War, after all the testimony on the question of his impeachment had been taken by a committee of the House of Representatives, only a few hours before the Articles of Impeachment were actually adopted, was inefficacious. See 1 J. STORY, COMMNTAImES ON THE CONSTrrUTION § 790 (3d ed. 1858) which indicates that the entire impeachment episode was
inappropriate.

866

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 8:843

nored. Both "understanding indulgence [and] self-righteous condemnation" are unattractive possibilities in judging one's peers.1e°
Public Law No. 96-458, by vesting the judicial councils and the
Judicial Conference of the United States with the responsibility
and authority to discipline the federal judiciary, invites these dangerous alternatives. Further, the vague disciplinary standard of
"conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts,"1 "1 provided in Public Law No.
96-458, is fertile ground for inequitable application.102
The case for absolute judicial independence is further buttressed since, given the historical experience of conflicts within the
judiciary in England and in the colonies, 10 3 the Framers may have
sought to protect judges from other judges, as well as from the legislative and executive branches:
The wise authors of our Constitution provided for judicial independence because they were familiar with history; they knew

that judges of the past-good, patriotic judges-had occasionally

lost not only their offices but had also sometimes lost their free-

dom and their heads because of the actions and decrees of other

judges. 104

100. Justice Story indicated in his Commentariesthat if courts were to try offenses of
a judicial character, they might suffer from that "immediate sympathy with the accused"
arising from that "common professional, or corporation spirit, which is apt to pervade those,
who are engaged in similiar pursuits and duties." 1 J. STORY, supranote 99, § 677, at 521-22,
quoted in Kramer & Barron, supra note 55, at 466. Kramer and Barron suggest that the
California Commission on Judicial Performance, discussed at notes 127-42 and accompanying text infra, has fallen prey to just such sympathy. "In the only case in which the Commission recommended a judge's removal, however, the California Supreme Court refused to
follow the unamimous Commisson recommendations." Id.
101. Judicial Council Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of .980, Pub. L.
No. 96-458, § 3(c)(1), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980).
102. The Framers were aware of the danger a vague standard could pose, which, as
Professor Berger points out is why they specifically rejected "maladministration" as a standard for impeachment. R. BERGER, supra note 64, at 163. In addition to the Framers' concerns, it is suggested that the proposed standards of conduct would be so vague "as to violate fundamental concepts of due process." Holloman, supra note 12, at 145.
103. Infringement by the King and Parliament was not the only threat to independence with which history had provided the Framers. Intrusion by the King on the tenure of
judges in colonies had produced conflict among the members themselves as to the entitlement to office. Such an instance was the battle for chief justiceship in colonial New Jersey
as described in Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The ColonialBackground, 124 U. PENN.
L. REv. 1104, 1125-30 (1976). Moreover, various periods in English history had borne witness to internal conflict within the judiciary, such as the battle of writs between Coke and
Bacon, T. PLUCKNErT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 241-45 (5th ed. 1956); and
frequent inconsistencies between the Courts of Equity and Law. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 246-51 (1908).
104. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 143 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
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This view is further substantiated by the unique make-up given
the judicial branch, compared with the other two.
The Constitution provides that the executive branch is organized as a hierarchy, with authority flowing from the chief executive
to lesser civil officers appointed by him. In order to preserve the
system and to promote efficiency, the power to appoint has been
held to include the power to remove.105 Accordingly, the executive
branch maintains a very simple system of self-discipline, although
subject to checks from the other two branches.
The legislative branch is composed of a confluence of individuals with coordinate responsibilities. Given the equality of membership, it would be entirely inappropriate to allow some of these
members to remove or to discipline others absent express authorization from the Constitution. Hence, the Framers provided article
I, section 4, the clear intention
of which was to allow Congress to
06
remove its own members.1

The judicial branch, like the legislative, is composed of equals.
It differs from the legislative branch, however, in that no provision
is provided for one group to discipline any other. The Constitution
left it to Congress, acting as a court,10 7 to impeach a jurist. The

establishment of an extrajudicial court indicates that the Framers
may not have wished the judges to have their own mechanism with
which to discipline their own members.
Moreover, internal mechanisms do exist in the judiciary to assure that justice will be done, whether or not any particular judge
cooperates. Higher courts have the ability to overrule lower courts
or to issue writs of mandamus to judges who continue to ignore the
law. The purpose of these checks is to redress any errors or misjudgments which may occur. Appeals and writs enable judges to
correct what could be viewed as substantive error or abuse. The
success of this system, however, depends upon the exercise of independent judgment by each judge. As one commentator has noted:
"It should be kept in mind that the provisions for securing the
independence of the judiciary were not created for the benefit of
the judges, but for the benefit of the judged." 0
The Framers were not unaware of this aspect of total indepen105.

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

106. Article I, section 4 of the United States Constitution provides: "When vacancies
happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue
writs of election to fill such vacancies." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
107.
108.

Id.
Kurland, supra note 7, at 698.
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dence of the judiciary. Achieving judicial independence had been
historically elusive l09 and was hard fought for in England. 10 In the
colonies, once judicial independence began to compete with executive power, it was the former which was sharply curtailed."" Nor
were the Framers unaware that they had selected a very cumbersome mechanism in impeachment;112 indeed, such awareness may
have been a significant factor in its selection. Apparently, the
Framers were willing to accept the risk of potentially unimpeachable behavior which could produce an occasional incompetent or eccentric judge, given the benefits of judicial independence.
1. The Impact of Public Law No.
Independence

96-458

on Judicial

In its report on the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
197911, ultimately passed as Public Law No. 96-458, the Senate
Judiciary Committee claimed to have devised legislation which
dodged the constitutional issues that plagued earlier judicial tenure legislation, thus avowedly achieving the desired goals of the
109. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
110. The struggle for independence by the judiciary had been ongoing in England, and
judges there, at the time the Constitution was being formulated, had only recently been
freed from the shackles of commission at the pleasure of the King.
111. In the English colonies, royal governors were instructed not to issue commissions
with good behavior tenure to colonial judges. Feerick, Impeaching FederalJudges: A Study
of the Constitutional Provisions, 39 FORD. L. REV. 1, 11 (1970); Smith, An Independent
Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 124 U. PENN. L. REV. 1104, 1112 (1976). The ostensible purpose for such exclusion was that "the state of learning in the colonies was so low that
it was with difficulty that men could be found competent to administer the judicial offices."
Ervin, supra note 19, at 112. The colonists were fully aware of the impact which Britishappointed and immediately removable judges would have on resulting court decisions. This
potential became clear when the limitations on colonial judges' commissions came as a response to the ever-loosening grip held by the King over the restless colonies.
Finally in 1772, in a move to assure total dependence on the Crown, King George I
established a fixed salary for superior court judges in Massachusetts. This action, which
prevented judges from receiving their usual grants from the Colonial House of Representatives, Council and Governor, exposed the delicate nature of judicial independence over
which control could be so immediately and completely exerted. The obvious implictions,
which by then had been institutionalized, prompted the outrage reflected in the Declaration
of Independence: "[hie [George III] has made judges dependent upon his will alone for the
payment of their salaries." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1776. See also R. BERGER,
supra note 64, at 142. Berger interprets this grievance as support for the reason that no
colonial constitution provided for scire facias removal.
112. See note 74 supra.
113. S. 1873, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), amended to include revisions to the judicial
councils, was originally known as the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1979. The
amended version ultimately became the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980. See note 38 supra.

Summer 1981]

JUDICIAL TENURE LEGISLATION

prior legislation while preserving valued judicial independence. 114
Despite these claims, the disciplinary provisions of the Act contravene the Constitution. Further, this legislation threatens to undermine the vitality and independence of the American judiciary.
Public Law No. 96-458 strikes at the very heart of judicial independence, giving the heretofore strictly administrative judicial
councils the power to discipline judges. 115 One need only review the
famous Chandler case to recognize the serious ramifications of investing judicial bodies with disciplinary authority over their
brethren.
Chandler v. Judicial Council"1' involved "political and personal hatreds of three decades" ' between District Judge Stephen
S. Chandler and his principle adversary Alfred P. Murrah, Chief
Judge of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Chandler's activities,
both on and off the bench, were undoubtedly egregious examples
of judicial abuse;118 however, the most alarming aspect of this case
was the decision of the Judicial Council, headed by Murrah, which
took matters into its own hands.
Proceeding on the very language which is the essence of Public
Law No. 96-458,119 the Judicial Council attempted to strip Judge
Chandler of his judicial powers, primarily by relieving him of cases
already assigned to him and refusing to assign him additional
cases. Chandler appealed to the Supreme Court and challenged the
authority of the Judicial Council. However, before the Supreme
114. "Although the question has never been finally settled, the Committee has
respected the position that removal of federal judges by any means other than impeachment
is arguably unconstitutional. Therefore, the proposed legislation is designed to avoid this
important issue, and removal of federal judges short of impeachment." JuDIciAL CoNDuCT

AcT REPORT, supra note 80, at 4.
115. The purpose of the judicial councils, as indicated by their legislative history, was
to act as mere housekeeping bodies, specifically to facilitate the correction of problems revealed in the quarterly reports of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. See
Removal of Federal Judges, supra note 69, at 1406 n.75. It is well established that the
judicial councils were at no time given "[any] power whatsoever to discipline any federal
judge for the omission or commission of any act." Ervin, supra note 19, at 125. See also
Holloman, supra note 12, at 138; Removal of Federal Judges, supra note 69 at 1406.
116. 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
117.

J. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS 189 (1974).

118. For example, Chandler had been a defendant in both civil and criminal litigation
as well as the subject of various disqualification battles for conflicts of interest. For a colorful narrative of these incidents as well as of Chandler's courtroom presence, see id. at 184224.
119. "Each judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within the circuit. The district judges
and bankruptcy judges shall promptly carry into effect all orders of the judicial council." 28
U.S.C. § 332(d) (1981) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-458).
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Court made its determination, the Judicial Council backed down
and restored Judge Chandler's judicial power.
Although the Supreme Court declined to rule on the substantive issues posed by Chandler, on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, 1 0 Justices' Black and Douglas both issued strong dissents.
Douglas declared the "case ripe for decision [with] no excuse for
declining to decide it"'12 1 and called the order of the Judicial Coun-

cil a de facto impeachment without constitutional power. 122 Beyond the constitutional limitation, Douglas recognized the inherent
danger of compromising judicial independence:
The mood of some federal judges is opposed to this view and they
are active to make all federal judges walk in some uniform step.
What happened to [Chandler] is not a rare instance; it has happened to other federal judges who have had perhaps a more libertarian approach to the Bill of Rights than their brethren ....
All power is a heady thing as evident by the increasing effort of
groups 12of
federal judges to act as referees over other federal
3
judges.

Public Law No. 96-458 institutionalizes the mechanism for
abuse which alarmed the dissent in Chandler, and which they
found unconstitutionally tantamount to impeachment. 1 24 The Act
120. The Court held that Judge Chandler had failed to make a case for the extraordinary relief of mandamus or prohibition. 398 U.S. at 89.
121. Id. at 133 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 137 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas' concerns were echoed by
Senator Helfin in considering legislation which would become Public Law No. 96-458: "I
consider it a serious mistake to merely gloss over the phrase . . . 'shall hold their offices
.' It would seem that any bill creating a court that has the power to take away a judge's
caseload, even on a temporary basis, would certainly indirectly violate this provision of the
Constitution. I think it important to remember that a federal judge is a civil officer serving
in the public interest. I do not feel that any judge who has been stripped of his duties and
responsibilities is 'holding office. . . ."' JUDICIAL CONDUCT ACT REPORT, supra note 80, at
22 (statement of Senator Howell Helfin).
123. 398 U.S. at 137 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
124. After the Supreme Court dismissed the Chandler case, pressure developed in
Congress to conduct an investigation to determine if Chandler's behavior constituted an
impeachable offense. After a two-year investigation, the Judiciary Committee exonerated
Chandler and additionally noted that the Judicial Council's action in stripping Judge Chandler of his power to hear cases "was equivalent to his removal as a judge . . . [and] completely beyond the legal authority of the council. . . . Confronted with seemingly complete
opposition and exasperated by intemperate, if not unreasoning, attacks on their judgment
and integrity, the circuit judges let themselves be goaded into action that was not within
their power to undertake." J. GOULDEN, supra note 117, at 242. The report also noted that
"the Chandler Case underscored the need for a new mechanism, other than the impeachment process, to resolve questions of judicial behavior and fitness to continue to hold judicial office." Id. The report found, however, that "the bitterness and animosity" between
Judges Murrah, Bohanon and Chandler "impaired their future usefulness and brought dis-
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alleges safeguards against such abuse;1 25 however, when judges are
allowed to judge their own, these safeguards may prove inadequate.1 26 A related threat is revealed by the recent experience with
the California Judicial Commission.
2.

The California Experience

California has had a judicial discipline commission since
1966.127 The California Commission on Judicial Performance differs from the federal system under Public Law No. 96-458, however, in that it is intended to be an independent1 28 constitutionally
created1 29 agency rather than part of the judiciary. Yet the California system illustrates the hazards to public confidence in the judiciary that even a quasi-in-house commission can produce.
The Commission was recently asked to investigate an allegation that two California Supreme Court decisions s" were held back
credit upon their courts." Id. Further, the report found that many of the actions against
Judge Chandler were "vindictive" and "motivated more by malice than by merit. . . .The
plotting and intrigue among the participants in this feud ultimately resulted in a political
cabal which does no credit to any of the parties involved." Id. at 243. This finding suggests
that judicial self-discipline may not be the proper mechanism, short of impeachment, to
discipline judges.
125. Referral of a complaint to the Judicial Conference of the United States is fashioned as a safeguard to prevent Chandler-type abuses where two or more judges within a
circuit are pitted against each other in what may be personal rivalry or an ethical conflict.
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUCIDIARY, supra note 39, at 12. It seems an unrealistic safeguard,
however, given that although Chandler was a judge "virtually unknown publicly outside his
own state [of Oklahoma], he had both admirers and detractors throughout the federal judiciary." J. GOULDEN, supra note 117, at 188-89, 219.
126. See notes 104-12 and accompanying text supra. The federal judiciary is in some
respects an intimate club, and referral of a problem complaint regarding one member to
other members of this club might invite judges to take sides.
127. Frankel, What's in a Name?-California Sets the Style, 41 L.A.B. BULL. 189
(1966).
128. Whereas the California Commission is slated as independent, this independence
becomes suspect given that all but two members (who are named by the State Bar of California) are gubernatorial and California Supreme Court appointees.
129. Even absent the historical emphasis on impeachment and judicial independence,
California, like every other state which has enacted a judiciary disciplinary system, has seen
fit to do so by constitutional amendment. JUDICIAL CONDUCT ACT REPORT, supra note 80, at
22 (statement of Senator Howell Helfin).
130. People v. Tanner, 23 Cal. 3d 16, 587 P.2d 1112, 151 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1978), rehearing granted, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 596 P.2d 328, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979); Fox v. City of Los
Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978). Tanner involved the California "use a gun, go to prison" statute, popular with law enforcement groups, but which
was overruled by the California Supreme Court. Fox concerned the legality of the City of
Los Angeles placing a lighted cross atop city hall during the Christmas season. The California Supreme Court held that the city could not display the cross.
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pending the retention election of four California justices, including
that of the California chief justice." 1 There were accusations that
the decisions had been purposely held back because their controversial nature could result in a protest vote at the polls. 132 The
subsequent investigation embroiled the Commission, as well as the
California Supreme Court itself, in the controversy.
California constitutional provisions require that any preliminary or probable-cause hearings be strictly confidential. 13 3 In an
effort to overcome the public perception of misconduct generated
by the election day media blitz, however, a special rule was
promulgated to overcome the constitutional restriction of confidentiality and open the hearings to the press and public.134 This decision shifted the focus of media coverage from the issues at hand to
the "[i]nternal operating procedures of the . . . Court . . . and
personal opinions, habits and prejudices of the members ....
The
minutiae of the deliberative process were unveiled and discussed,
[with the result that] the public [was] entertained and titillated,
and the California Supreme Court extensively damaged."' 3 5
The situation was exacerbated when, after it had piqued the
media's "prurient interest," 3 6 Associate Justice Stanley Mosk
brought suit to have the hearings closed. 37 Mosk was successful,
and on October 18, 1979, the hearings were closed. A month later,
the Commission reported that the investigation had been terminated and that "no formal
charges [would] be filed against any Su3s
preme Court justice."'
It came as no surprise that the Commission Hearings,
designed to enhance public confidence in the California Supreme
Court, were seen as a "whitewash. . . investigation by an in-house
131. Under California law, appellate court justices must be confirmed every 12 years
by voters in order to remain on the bench.
132. "In the election, the chief justice was retained by only fifty-two percent of the
vote,- the smallest margin by which any justice in California has ever won retention. It is not
over-speculative to conclude that had the court decided and released the Tanner and Fox
opinions before the election, Chief Justice Bird could well have been defeated." Cameron,
The CaliforniaSupreme Court Hearings-A Tragedy That Should and Could Have Been
Avoided, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 11, 13 (1980) (footnote omitted).
133. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(f) (1849, amended 1976).
134. CAL. RULES OF COURT, Rule 902.5 (West 1981).
135. Cameron, supra note 132, at 18.
136. Remarks of Associate Justice Stanley Mosk, Administrative Law Judges Symposium (Feb. 15, 1980).
137. Mosk v. Superior Ct., 25 Cal. 3d 474, 601 P.2d 1030, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979).
138.

CAL. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, REPORT ON STATUS AND ANNOUNCEMENT

OF RESULTS

(Nov. 5, 1979).
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group."1 9 As a result, the public viewed the system with contempt
and suspicion, which tainted its perception of individual judges
and the judiciary as a whole.
The judiciary relies on trust for its strength. 140 Accountability
must be forced from without, not from within. If judges, or a select
group appointed by the judges, are allowed to judge their own,
public trust is shaken. To overcome this mistrust, the disciplinary
body must open up its proceedings; but the price of this action is
to expose the entire judiciary to unprecedented influence in the
form of public approval 14or1 disapproval, which may eventually be
reflected in its decisions.
The authors of Public Law No. 96-458 were well aware that
public disapproval could influence and harm the overall functioning of the judiciary. They recognized that disgruntled litigants
might bring vexatious complaints against particular judges. The
authors of the Act thus built into the system the same sorts of
insular safeguards of confidentiality1 42 which cost the California
system its credibility. The root of the problem, however, is not
confidentiality; it is the very structure of a system which requires
judges to judge their own.
Conclusion
Traditionally, judicial reform measures follow closely on the
heels of political necessity. Consistent with this phenomenon, the
proposal recently approved by Congress has been said to have been
induced by the public's "crisis of confidence"1 43 in government.
Public demand for governmental accountability has produced a
condition which the Act attempts to address by requiring judges,
like other public officials, to be responsive to public sentiment.
139. 65 A.B.A.J. 1796, 1797-(1979).
140. Id. at 1798.
141. "Appellate lawyers say the [California Supreme Court] is no longer a collegial
body and lawyers must look to each individual justice for a decision. As if to bear that out,
court opinions since the hearings have lineups of dissents and concurrences that mock all
past experience. The decisions themselves have a decidedly more conservative tinge than
those issued prior to the hearings." Id.
142. The presiding judicial council is provided with discretion to dismiss any complaints which it views as nonmeritorious. A complainant can ask for a review of the dismissal of a complaint at this stage, yet the reviewing body is again a strictly internal one: there
is no appellate review of its actions. Conceivably, a definitionally well-founded complaint
could be avoided by subsequent dismissals. Tight internal control is facilitated by strict
confidentiality. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 3(a)(14), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980).
143. Holloman, supra note 12, at 135.
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There have been previous efforts to remove judges for various reasons, but this recent trend toward strict accountability reflects a
modern perception of the judiciary. The proponents of the judicial
tenure legislation do not view the judiciary as sacred and would
not absolutely "immunize them in any way.""""
It has been suggested that the words of the Constitution concerning good behavior, tenure, impeachment and removal, which
have been the source of much recent debate, had a clear meaning
for the Framers. The Framers exalted the judiciary as a vital element of a strong democracy, an element which should be free from
the ongoing scrutiny and periodic votes of confidence which are
typical of other governmental bodies.145 This perception is consistent with the view that impeachment is the sole method of removal. The practical result of Public Law No. 96-458 is to create a
system of constructive impeachment by "vest[ing] exactly the
same power. . . by a different name."' " 6 The ultimate result will
be to render the impeachment process a dead-letter. There will be
neither incentive nor purpose to turn to the admittedly cumbersome process, the very nature of which has acted as the catalyst to
this "supplemental" process.
Were the Framers shortsighted in fashioning only an impeachment device? The system produced a federal bench with a high
level of competence and integrity. 4 7 The nonexclusivists argue
that the small number of judges impeached reflects the cumbersome nature of the impeachment process and demonstrates the
need for a supplemental mechanism, but there is certainly no guarantee that the recent passage of Public Law No. 96-458 will
achieve the end of insuring greater public confidence in the judiciary and, by implication, improve the quality of justice generally.
Even assuming that the Act will effectively do so, the ultimate
costs may outweigh the short-term benefits.
There is, at present, a sense that the members of the federal
judiciary are competent, conscientious and dedicated individuals.
The Act threatens to change this public perception and to subject
144. 1976 Hearings, supra note 37, at 106 (statement of Prof. Raoul Berger).
145. Stolz, supra note 55, at 663 n.22.
146. Otis, supra note 20, at 27.
147. The numbers corroborate this quality in that of the more than 2000 persons who
have served as federal judges, fifty-five have been subjected to formal investigation, and of
these, only eight have been impeached by the House of Representatives. Only four of the
eight were convicted by the Senate and thrown from office. R. BERGER, supra note 64, at
166; Thompson & Politt, Impeachment of FederalJudges: An Historical Overview, 49 N.C.
L. REv. 87, 92 (1970). See generally JUDICIAL CONDUCT ACT REPORT, supra note 80, at 5.

Summer 1981]

JUDICIAL TENURE LEGISLATION

the judiciary to the same investigatory rigor which has characterized legislative and executive investigations. Additionally, the Act
risks sacrificing the Framers' efforts to ensure a constitutionally
guaranteed independent judiciary in the name of public pressure
for judicial accountability.
Ultimately, public confidence will not be engendered, but
eroded. Aggrieved litigants will be given the opportunity to lodge
personal complaints against individual judges or against the disciplinary body itself. For the legitimate complaints, the publicity
which inevitably will be attached to the discipline of a few "bad"
judges, will disproportionately diminish the reputation of the judiciary as a whole.
Constant public scrutiny is foreign to the judiciary and could
well discourage qualified lawyers from serving on the federal
bench. The necessity of attracting top-quality jurists to assure a
strong judiciary outweighs the danger of permitting a corrupt, incompetent or eccentric judge to preside, given the checks which
already exist within the judiciary. The tremendous prestige and
honor associated with the federal bench have traditionally compensated jurists for the strenuous demands of the job and for the economic sacrifices they made in leaving private practice to assume a
judgeship. Subjecting individual jurists to investigations could well
discourage qualified people from making these sacrifices.
A concern with accountability to one's peers might also encourage conformity with the views of the current power block and
discourage the type of creative thinking that, characteristically
gives the common law
the flexibility it needs in order to meet
14 8
changing conditions.
Finally, the most dangerous aspect of disciplinary legislation is
the intrusion of politics into a traditionally politically immune
body.149 The origins of judicial tenure legislation are rooted in po148.

This was Justice Douglas' concern in his dissent in Chandler.See note 123 and

accompanying text supra.
149.

It has been suggested that total independence of judges is the only effective way

to cleanse them from the political process from which their appointments arose. "But certainly there is no point in tinkering with the independence of federal judges by subjecting
their tenure to control of other federal judges appointed by the same defective process.
Without their independence, the federal judges will have lost all that separates them from

total subordination to the political processes from which they ought to be aloof." Kurland,
supra note 7, at 667. See also J. GOULDEN, supra note 117, at 21-74 (1974).
Preserving this vital forum of free expression from political influence was a matter of

continuing concern to Justice Douglas when he declared, "It is time that an end be put to
these efforts of federal judges to ride herd on other federal judges. .

.

.Federal judges are

entitled, like other people, to the full freedom of the First Amendment. .

.

.I search the
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litical concerns. In times of national crisis, the courts conceivably

could be purged for political purposes. 150 The judiciary must be
able to withstand the change in political winds, for "[i]f there is
any lesson to be drawn from the political turmoil of recent years, it
is the indispensable need for a judiciary able to serve, in the words
of Edmund Burke, as a 'safe asylum' during times of crisis."1" 1
Concerns change from generation to generation, but the continuity and independence of the federal judiciary, once lost, may
be gone forever.

Constitution in vain for any power of surveillance that other federal judges have over those
aberrations. Some of the idiosyncrasies may be displeasing to those who walk in more measured, conservative steps. But those idiosyncrasies can be of no possible constitutional concern to other federal judges." Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 140-41 (1970)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
150. See Holloman, supra note 12, at 150.
151. Kaufman, Chilling JudicialIndependence, 88 YALE L.J. 681 (1979).

